CASE DIGEST IN SUCCESSION: Transmission/Acquisition through Death (topic)
303 SCRA 683, February 25, 1999
Re:
Transmission/Acquisition through Death
Facts:
On March 23, 1987, Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without
issue. She left five (5) parcels of land. At the time of her death, Evarista
was survived by three sets of heirs, viz: (1) Francisco M. dela Merced, her
legitimate brother; survived by his wife Blanquita Errea dela Merced and their three
legitimate children; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan, her niece who is the only
daughter of Rosa de la Merced-Platon (a sister who died in 1943); and (3) the
legitimate children of Eugenia dela Merced-Adriano (another sister of Evarista
who died in 1965).
On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent,
Evarista M. dela Merced executed an extrajudicial settlement adjudicating the
properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share of one-third (1/3)
pro-indiviso.
On July 26 ,1990, private respondent Joselito P. Dela Merced ,
illegitimate son of the late Francisco de la Merced, filed a Petition for
Annulment of the Extrajudicial Settlement alleging that he was fraudulently
omitted from the said settlement made by petitioners, who were fully aware of
his relation to the late Francisco. Claiming successional rights, private
respondent Joselito prayed that he be included as one of the beneficiaries, to
share in the one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of the deceased
Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of Francisco.
In the Petition under consideration, petitioners insist that being
an illegitimate child, private respondent Joselito is barred from inheriting
from Evarista because of the provision of Article 992 of the New Civil Code, which
lays down an impassable barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate
families.
Issue:
Whether or not the illegitimate child
is barred from inheriting from the deceased?
Ruling:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable because involved
here is not a situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of
his father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it
is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the
latter's share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited from the deceased
sister, Evarista.
As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present
case is Article 777 of the New Civil Code, which provides that the rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Since
Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of
the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco
died, his heirs, namely: his spouse, legitimate children, and the private
respondent, Joselito, an illegitimate child, inherited his (Francisco's) share
in the estate of Evarista. It bears stressing that Joselito does not claim to
be an heir of Evarista by right of representation but participates in his own
right, as an heir of the late Francisco, in the latter's share (or portion
thereof) in the estate of Evarista. There is no legal obstacle for private
respondent Joselito, admittedly the son of the late Francisco, to inherit in
his own right as an heir to his father's estate, which estate includes a
one-third (1/3) undivided share in the estate of Evarista.
Opulencia v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125853, July 30, 1998
Facts:
A complaint for specific performance
filed with the court a quo, herein private respondents, Aladin Simundac and
Miguel Oliven alleged that petitioner Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in
their favor a contract to sell Lot 2125 that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of
P300, 000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her
obligations under the contract.
Petitioner admitted the execution of the
contract in favor of plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00 as down payment.
However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property
subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena
(petitioner's father), in respect of which a petition for probate was filed
with the Regional Trial Court. At the time the contract was executed, the
parties were aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract
to sell was not approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of
the contract petitioner had offered to return the down payment received from
private respondents, but the latter refused to accept it. She further argued
that the contract was subject to a suspensive condition, which was the probate
of the will of defendant's father Demetrio Carpena.
Issue:
Is a contract to sell a real property
involved in testate proceedings valid and binding without the approval of the
probate court?
Ruling:
In a nutshell, petitioner contends
that "where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a
testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any
transaction involving it without prior approval of the Probate Court." She
maintains that the Contract to sell is void because it was not approved by the
probate court, as required by Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 7. Regulations
for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. The court having jurisdiction of the estate
of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage,
or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it
appears necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations.
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals,
Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because
petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not
as an executrix or administratrix of the estate.
In the contract, she represented herself as
the "lawful owner" and seller of the subject parcel of land. She also
explained the reason for the sale to be "difficulties in her living"
conditions and consequent "need of cash." These representations clearly
evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she
entered into the Contract to Sell.
Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or
heirs from the moment of the decedent's death. Petitioner, therefore, became
the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of
judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to sell, because the
petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share
in the estate of her late father.
The possession of hereditary property is
deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of
the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted.' And Manresa
with reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs 'becomes
the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or
portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus
formed among the co-owners of the estate while it remains undivided. Every part
owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of
such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the community.
Hence, where some of the heirs, without the
concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, the
sale is valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may
be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.
The Contract to Sell stipulates that
petitioner's offer to sell is contingent on the "complete clearance of the
court on the Last Will Testament of her father." Consequently, although
the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private
respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation of
the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private
respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the
termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no
basis for petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a
premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed,
it is settled that "the sale made by an heir of his share in an
inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the
way of such administration."
Finally, petitioner is estopped from
backing out of her representations in her valid Contract to sell with private
respondents, from whom she had already received P300, 000 as initial payment of
the purchase price. Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and
representations, to the prejudice of the private respondents who have relied on
them.
Coronel v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103577, October 7, 1996
Facts:
On January 19, 1985,
defendants-appellants Romulo Coronel, et al. executed a document entitled
"Receipt of Down Payment" in favor of plaintiff Ramona Patricia
Alcaraz. The stipulation reads:
We
bind ourselves to effect the transfer in our names from our deceased father,
Constancio P. Coronel, the transfer certificate of title immediately upon
receipt of the down payment above-stated. On our presentation of the TCT
already in or name, We will immediately execute the deed of absolute sale of
said property and Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz shall immediately pay the
balance of the P1,190,000.00.
On February 6, 1985, the property
originally registered in the name of the Coronels' father was transferred in
their names under TCT No. 327043. On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the
property to intervenor-appellant Catalina B. Mabanag for One Million Five
Hundred Eighty Thousand (P1,580,000.00).
For this reason, Coronels canceled and
rescinded the contract with Ramona by depositing the down payment paid by
Concepcion in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. On April 25, 1985,
the Coronels executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property in
favor of Catalina. On June 5, 1985, a new title over the subject property was
issued in the name of Catalina.
Issue:
Whether the Receipt of down payment
embodied a contract of sale?
Whether or not petitioners are the
absolute owners of the property?
Ruling:
We hold that the contract between the
petitioner and the respondent was a contract to sell where the ownership or
title is retained by the seller and is not to pass until the full payment of
the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition and failure of
which is not a breach, casual or serious, but simply an event that prevented
the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar
being the sons and daughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel are
compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation of law. Thus, at
the point their father drew his last breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes
insofar as the subject property is concerned, such that any rights or
obligations pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. It is
expressly provided that rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent.
Be it also noted that petitioners' claim
that succession may not be declared unless the creditors have been paid is
rendered moot by the fact that they were able to effect the transfer of the
title to the property from the decedent's name to their names on February 6,
1985.
Aside from this, petitioners are precluded
from raising their supposed lack of capacity to enter into an agreement at that
time and they cannot be allowed to now take a posture contrary to that which
they took when they entered into the agreement with private respondent Ramona
P. Alcaraz. Having represented themselves as the true owners of the subject
property at the time of sale, petitioners cannot claim now that they were not
yet the absolute owners thereof at that time.
G.R. No. 61584, 215 SCRA 866
Facts:
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, left Lot No.
1091 with an area of 69,080 square meters. She begot two legitimate children,
namely: Pascual Paulmitan, who also died in 1953, and Donato Paulmitan, who is
one of the petitioners. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato's daughter while
the third petitioner, Rodolfo Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale
over the same in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter. Sometime
in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was forfeited and sold at a
public auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental being the
buyer. On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property from the
Provincial Government of Negros Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09.
On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the
late Pascual Paulmitan filed on January 18, 1975 with the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental a Complaint against petitioners to partition the
properties plus damages. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed that she acquired
exclusive ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale executed in her
favor by her father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption
from the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental.
Issue:
Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership over the subject
lot
May a co-owner
acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common?
Ruling:
When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the
respondents, succeeded him in the co-ownership of the disputed property.
Pascual Paulmitan's right of ownership over an undivided portion of the
property passed on to his children, who, from the time of Pascual's death,
became co-owners with their uncle Donato over the disputed decedent estate.
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana
P. Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only
sell that portion which may be allotted to him upon termination of the
co-ownership. The sale did not prejudice
the rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of the land which
they inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land
with the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in the property and consequently made the
buyer a co-owner of the land until it is partitioned.
The sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his
daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership
over the entire land but merely transferred to her the one half (1/2) undivided
share of her father, thus making her the co-owner of the land in question with
the respondents, her first cousins. The redemption of the land made by Fanesa
did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land
subject of the co-ownership.
The right of repurchase may be exercised by
co-owner with respect to his share alone. While the records show that
petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses
therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did
not put to end the existing state of co-ownership. There is no doubt that
redemption of property entails a necessary expense. The result is that the
property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro,
under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a
partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the
property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the
part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain
the property and consolidate title thereto in his name. But the provision does
not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does
not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.
Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the
entire lot by virtue of the redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire
the right to reimbursed for half of the redemption price she paid to the
Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on behalf of her co-owners. Until
reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien upon the subject property for the amount due
her.
Rioferio v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004
Facts:
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in
Angeles City leaving several personal and real properties located in Angeles
City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City. He also left a widow, respondent
Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had
seven children who are the herein respondents. Apart from the respondents, the
demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their children. They
are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he entered
into an extra-marital relationship with her during the subsistence of his
marriage to Esperanza sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners Veronica,
Alberto and Rowena.
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes
Orfinada discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her
children executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the
properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City. Respondents
also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00
from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the
extra-judicial settlement. On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of
Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real
Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles before
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City.
On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer interposing the defense that the property
subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the
properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero and that the
titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent
had managed to register them in his name. Petitioners also raised the
affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but
rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the
administration proceedings. On April 29, 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for
Hearing on the aforesaid ground.
Issue:
Whether the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights
belonging to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration
proceedings
Ruling:
Pending the filing of administration
proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in
behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of
Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision
in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and
obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation
of law.
Even if administration proceedings have
already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator
has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack
of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation.
While permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to
bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing
the deceased. These rules are easily
applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But
no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for
the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator
has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to
wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights
and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the
rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence
recognizes two exceptions, viz:
(1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and
(2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act
complained of31 and he is made a party defendant. Evidently, the
necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the
estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not more,
as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to
bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.
Therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue
for the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of
administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there is
no appointed administrator such as in this case.
Emnace v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia
were partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry.
Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and
executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership
properties. Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente
Tabanao's untimely demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's
heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render
an accounting of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his
promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total
assets of the partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of
P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand for payment thereof. Consequently,
Tabanao’s heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for
accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds
of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit,
and lack of capacity of the estate of Tabanao to sue. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss. It held that venue was properly laid because,
while realties were involved, the action was directed against a particular
person on the basis of his personal liability; hence, the action is not only a
personal action but also an action in personam.
As regards petitioner's argument of
lack of jurisdiction over the action because the prescribed docket fee was not
paid considering the huge amount involved in the claim, the trial court noted
that a request for accounting was made in order that the exact value of the
partnership may be ascertained and, thus, the correct docket fee may be paid.
Finally, the trial court held that the heirs of Tabanao had a right to sue in
their own names, in view of the provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code,
which states that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent.
Issue:
Whether the heirs of Vicente has the capacity to sue in the case
Ruling:
Petitioner
asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to
sue since she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate.
Petitioner's objection in this regard is misplaced.
The surviving
spouse of Vicente does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix
of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are
complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very
moment of Vicente Tabanao' s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was
concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.
Whatever claims
and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were
transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by
succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,
rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a
person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective
hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.
A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion
Tabanao as executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs
to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of
their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally
pertaining to the decedent.35 From the moment of his death, his
rights as a partner and to demand fulfillment of petitioner's obligations as
outlined in their dissolution agreement were transmitted to respondents. They,
therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court's intervention to compel
petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
