Saturday, July 4, 2015




Majority of the members of the group believes and argues that the multiparty political system is no longer applicable in the Philippines because of the following arguments and reasons:

Philippine Political Parties Lack Solid Ideological Moorings

Most of the political parties in the Philippines today lack really lack solid ideological moorings and their members are blissfully unaware of what their parties really stand for. Many party members just follow the stance of their leader who may shift directions as the wind blows. Most political parties depend on the personal fortunes their individual leaders possess to fund their political work.

Philippine Political Parties are Basically Leader Oriented

Many political parties in the Philippines today exist primarily due to their leaders' capability to float with the tide, not because of their political ideology.. Thus, when the leaders lose interest in their party affairs or are lured to join other groups, their original parties disappear and new ones rise up in the horizon.

Multiparty System Promotes a Culture of Turncoatism and Political Butterflies

Today, Philippine politics and governane is plague by the negative cultures of political butterflies and turncoatism. Most politicians cross over from one party to another with the purpose of gravitating around the political parties in power.

Saturday, April 4, 2015 in , , , , , , , ,

The study of Political Science

       The study of Political Science

          "Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding it, misdiagnosing it and then  misapplying the wrong remedies" - Groucho Marx

           I chose Groucho Marx's quotation because it shows that there are no solutions, nor alternatives to the problems in Political Science because of the people who are involved in it. However, what Marx does not know is, there is a solution to all of this problems that the society is experiencing. There are tools and methods that people can use to solve this problem. The people just doesn't notice because they are busy finding answers from other sciences, like natural sciences and such. Politics might not interest everyone, but no one can escape it. "Politics is designed to break your heart while making your really angry at the process." Whatever change that will happen in the government or politics, it would always affect you whether you like it or not.

         According to a French poet, named Paul Valery, "Politics is the act or preventing people from taking part in affairs which properly concern them." Despite how cynical his definition of politics is, there is still a way for people to tale part in the political affairs.  They can do this by studying Political Science.... In Roger Smith's "Should we make Political Science More of a Science or More about Politics?, he pointed out that Political Science is needed to improve the human knowledge of people on political issues that is very important tot them. Hence, when they view the study of politics as about them, or their lives as a whole, they begin to hope that tools as research, theories, etc., that are committed to such study will produce results that will speak for them as to their concerns, and interest. This is where theories and research comes into play. The theories (scientific approaches that are employed in the study of political science helpful in making our decisions, and in promoting open tools that explains the differences of people in a society when it comes to politics and their national interest. In doing research, political science can be vulnerable to ideological infiltration which means we can include ourselves, own theories, etc., in solving the problems.

         In connection to, In Arthur Lupia's "Evaluation Political Science Research: Information for Buyer and Sellers", he emphasized the public value of basic research in Political Science. In order to grasp the importance of research in Political Science, we must take into consideration that Political Science, like other other scientific research is a product. "A product that clarifies the properties and mechanics of the complex political phenomena that affect many aspects of our lives." It affect our lives, because politics is inseparable from our lives. We all live on politics, We can improve our existence by using theories or research methods to uncover the properties and mechanics of forces that are fundamental to our lives. In Lupia's article, he emphasized that theories or research provides for strategies for political sciences, policy makers, consumers and citizens In my opinion, NSF should fund political science research in order to have a more concrete research, and have nicer results in governments. NSF can be used as a tool to help people know more about the politics.

          Upon reading the articles by Roger Smith, and Arthur Lupia, I came to realize that theories are important in studying political science and in doing research because it helps in developing a coherent cumulative body of knowledge. We must participation and get involve in refocusing our own discipline (Political Science) to be empirical and logical. We should also take into consideration, that people have their own political preferences, which explain why we often ignore relevant issues in Politics, but one thing is common. And that is we live in a world of Politics. As long as there is greed for power and glory, it will be difficult to solve anything in Politics, especially the government, but with the help of scientific approaches that political science teaches or employs, there is always  an alternative or solution. 

"You can't ignore politics, no matter how much you'd like to" - Molly Ivins.

- my paper (july 2, 2008) 

  • Arthur Lupia. 2000. "Evaluating Political Science Research: Information for Buyers and Sellers."  PS: Political Science and Politics
  •  Roger M. Smith, University of Pennsylvania “Should We Make Political Science More of a Science or More about Politics?” 

Friday, November 15, 2013 in ,

CASE DIGEST IN SUCCESSION: Transmission/Acquisition through Death (topic)

 ransmission/Acquisition through Death (topics_

303 SCRA 683, February 25, 1999
Re: Transmission/Acquisition through Death

On March 23, 1987, Evarista M. dela Merced died intestate, without issue. She left five (5) parcels of land. At the time of her death, Evarista was survived by three sets of heirs, viz: (1) Francisco M. dela Merced, her legitimate brother; survived by his wife Blanquita Errea dela Merced and their three legitimate children; (2) Teresita P. Rupisan, her niece who is the only daughter of Rosa de la Merced-Platon (a sister who died in 1943); and (3) the legitimate children of Eugenia dela Merced-Adriano (another sister of Evarista who died in 1965).

          On April 20, 1989, the three sets of heirs of the decedent, Evarista M. dela Merced executed an extrajudicial settlement adjudicating the properties of Evarista to them, each set with a share of one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso.

          On July 26 ,1990, private respondent Joselito P. Dela Merced , illegitimate son of the late Francisco de la Merced, filed a Petition for Annulment of the Extrajudicial Settlement alleging that he was fraudulently omitted from the said settlement made by petitioners, who were fully aware of his relation to the late Francisco. Claiming successional rights, private respondent Joselito prayed that he be included as one of the beneficiaries, to share in the one-third (1/3) pro-indiviso share in the estate of the deceased Evarista, corresponding to the heirs of Francisco.

          In the Petition under consideration, petitioners insist that being an illegitimate child, private respondent Joselito is barred from inheriting from Evarista because of the provision of Article 992 of the New Civil Code, which lays down an impassable barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families.

          Whether or not the illegitimate child is barred from inheriting from the deceased?

          Article 992 of the New Civil Code is not applicable because involved here is not a situation where an illegitimate child would inherit ab intestato from a legitimate sister of his father, which is prohibited by the aforesaid provision of law. Rather, it is a scenario where an illegitimate child inherits from his father, the latter's share in or portion of, what the latter already inherited from the deceased sister, Evarista.

          As opined by the Court of Appeals, the law in point in the present case is Article 777 of the New Civil Code, which provides that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Since Evarista died ahead of her brother Francisco, the latter inherited a portion of the estate of the former as one of her heirs. Subsequently, when Francisco died, his heirs, namely: his spouse, legitimate children, and the private respondent, Joselito, an illegitimate child, inherited his (Francisco's) share in the estate of Evarista. It bears stressing that Joselito does not claim to be an heir of Evarista by right of representation but participates in his own right, as an heir of the late Francisco, in the latter's share (or portion thereof) in the estate of Evarista. There is no legal obstacle for private respondent Joselito, admittedly the son of the late Francisco, to inherit in his own right as an heir to his father's estate, which estate includes a one-third (1/3) undivided share in the estate of Evarista.

Opulencia v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125853, July 30, 1998

          A complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo, herein private respondents, Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven alleged that petitioner Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor a contract to sell Lot 2125 that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of P300, 000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations under the contract.

Petitioner admitted the execution of the contract in favor of plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00 as down payment. However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner's father), in respect of which a petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court. At the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract petitioner had offered to return the down payment received from private respondents, but the latter refused to accept it. She further argued that the contract was subject to a suspensive condition, which was the probate of the will of defendant's father Demetrio Carpena.

Is a contract to sell a real property involved in testate proceedings valid and binding without the approval of the probate court?

          In a nutshell, petitioner contends that "where the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the Probate Court." She maintains that the Contract to sell is void because it was not approved by the probate court, as required by Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate.  The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules and when it appears necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations.

As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate.

In the contract, she represented herself as the "lawful owner" and seller of the subject parcel of land. She also explained the reason for the sale to be "difficulties in her living" conditions and consequent "need of cash." These representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell.

Hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decedent's death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father.

The possession of hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted.' And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs 'becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the estate while it remains undivided. Every part owner may assign or mortgage his part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of the community.

Hence, where some of the heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by their deceased father, the sale is valid, but that the effect thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted to the vendors upon the partition of the estate.

The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's offer to sell is contingent on the "complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her father." Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is settled that "the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration."

Finally, petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid Contract to sell with private respondents, from whom she had already received P300, 000 as initial payment of the purchase price. Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and representations, to the prejudice of the private respondents who have relied on them.

Coronel v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 103577, October 7, 1996

          On January 19, 1985, defendants-appellants Romulo Coronel, et al. executed a document entitled "Receipt of Down Payment" in favor of plaintiff Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. The stipulation reads:

We bind ourselves to effect the transfer in our names from our deceased father, Constancio P. Coronel, the transfer certificate of title immediately upon receipt of the down payment above-stated. On our presentation of the TCT already in or name, We will immediately execute the deed of absolute sale of said property and Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz shall immediately pay the balance of the P1,190,000.00.

On February 6, 1985, the property originally registered in the name of the Coronels' father was transferred in their names under TCT No. 327043. On February 18, 1985, the Coronels sold the property to intervenor-appellant Catalina B. Mabanag for One Million Five Hundred Eighty Thousand (P1,580,000.00).

For this reason, Coronels canceled and rescinded the contract with Ramona by depositing the down payment paid by Concepcion in the bank in trust for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz. On April 25, 1985, the Coronels executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property in favor of Catalina. On June 5, 1985, a new title over the subject property was issued in the name of Catalina.

          Whether the Receipt of down payment embodied a contract of sale?
          Whether or not petitioners are the absolute owners of the property?

          We hold that the contract between the petitioner and the respondent was a contract to sell where the ownership or title is retained by the seller and is not to pass until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive condition and failure of which is not a breach, casual or serious, but simply an event that prevented the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.

          Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar being the sons and daughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel are compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation of law. Thus, at the point their father drew his last breath, petitioners stepped into his shoes insofar as the subject property is concerned, such that any rights or obligations pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. It is expressly provided that rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.

Be it also noted that petitioners' claim that succession may not be declared unless the creditors have been paid is rendered moot by the fact that they were able to effect the transfer of the title to the property from the decedent's name to their names on February 6, 1985.

Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack of capacity to enter into an agreement at that time and they cannot be allowed to now take a posture contrary to that which they took when they entered into the agreement with private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz. Having represented themselves as the true owners of the subject property at the time of sale, petitioners cannot claim now that they were not yet the absolute owners thereof at that time.

G.R. No. 61584, 215 SCRA 866

Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, left Lot No. 1091 with an area of 69,080 square meters. She begot two legitimate children, namely: Pascual Paulmitan, who also died in 1953, and Donato Paulmitan, who is one of the petitioners. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa is Donato's daughter while the third petitioner, Rodolfo Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the same in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter. Sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was forfeited and sold at a public auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental being the buyer. On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property from the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09.

On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the late Pascual Paulmitan filed on January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a Complaint against petitioners to partition the properties plus damages. Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claimed that she acquired exclusive ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale executed in her favor by her father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption from the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental.

Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership over the subject lot
May a co-owner acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in common?

When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents, succeeded him in the co-ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right of ownership over an undivided portion of the property passed on to his children, who, from the time of Pascual's death, became co-owners with their uncle Donato over the disputed decedent estate. When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana P. Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell that portion which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership.  The sale did not prejudice the rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of the land which they inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with the buyer but transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in the property and consequently made the buyer a co-owner of the land until it is partitioned.

The sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the land to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership over the entire land but merely transferred to her the one half (1/2) undivided share of her father, thus making her the co-owner of the land in question with the respondents, her first cousins. The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership.

The right of repurchase may be exercised by co-owner with respect to his share alone. While the records show that petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership. There is no doubt that redemption of property entails a necessary expense. The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title thereto in his name. But the provision does not give to the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.

Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of the redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to reimbursed for half of the redemption price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on behalf of her co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien upon the subject property for the amount due her.

Rioferio v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004

On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the herein respondents. Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their children. They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he entered into an extra-marital relationship with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners Veronica, Alberto and Rowena.

On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City. Respondents also found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement. On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles before the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City.

On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer  interposing the defense that the property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed to register them in his name. Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the pendency of the administration proceedings. On April 29, 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Set Affirmative Defenses for Hearing on the aforesaid ground.

Whether the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceedings

Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code "that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation.

While permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of31 and he is made a party defendant. Evidently, the necessity for the heirs to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if not more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the guilty parties himself.

Therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there is no appointed administrator such as in this case.

Emnace v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001

Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties. Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanao's untimely demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao's heirs any statement of assets and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership's finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao's heirs the deceased's 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand for payment thereof. Consequently, Tabanao’s heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit, and lack of capacity of the estate of Tabanao to sue. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. It held that venue was properly laid because, while realties were involved, the action was directed against a particular person on the basis of his personal liability; hence, the action is not only a personal action but also an action in personam.

As regards petitioner's argument of lack of jurisdiction over the action because the prescribed docket fee was not paid considering the huge amount involved in the claim, the trial court noted that a request for accounting was made in order that the exact value of the partnership may be ascertained and, thus, the correct docket fee may be paid. Finally, the trial court held that the heirs of Tabanao had a right to sue in their own names, in view of the provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

Whether the heirs of Vicente has the capacity to sue in the case

Petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue since she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his estate. Petitioner's objection in this regard is misplaced.

The surviving spouse of Vicente does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao' s death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.

Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died.

A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent.35 From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand fulfillment of petitioner's obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue and seek the court's intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.